Complaint July 10, 2024 (2024)

Case

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Jul 18, 2024 |Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment |Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment |24CV033074-590

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Jul 18, 2024 |Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment |Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment |24CV033046-590

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TREA Centric Gateway LLC VS Michael Miller

Jul 15, 2024 |Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment |Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment |24CV032144-590

Case

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Jul 15, 2024 |Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment |Civil Magistrate Summary Ejectment |24CV032210-590

Ruling

MICHELLE TRAVIS, ET AL. VS FRED DI BERNARDO, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |23LBCV00238

Case Number: 23LBCV00238 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: S25 Background On February 8, 2023, Plaintiffs filed a complaint against Defendants Fred Di Bernardo (erroneously sued as Fred Di Bernardo), Kathryn Vance (erroneously sued as Kathryn Vance) (collectively Defendants) and Does 1 through 20, alleging four causes of action: (1) breach of governing documents, (2) nuisance, (3) negligence and (4) declaratory relief. Plaintiffs allege that they, at all relevant times, owned and resided at a condominium at 162nd Place Unit 303, Long Beach, CA 90803 and that Defendant Bernardo has, at all relevant times, owned Unit 403, located directly above Plaintiffs condominium. (Compl., ¶¶ 1-3.) Plaintiffs assert Defendant Vance resides at Unit 403 as a Tenant. (Compl., ¶ 4.) The two condominiums are part of the Peninsula Pacifica Homeowners Association (the HOA); Plaintiffs allege the HOA and each of its members, including Plaintiffs and Defendant Dibernardo, are bound by the Declaration of Establishment of Basis Protective Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, Covenants and Reservations (the CC&Rs) recorded in the Official Records of Los Angeles County on August 23, 1973 as well as the Bylaws of Peninsula Pacifica Homeowners Association (the Bylaws). (Compl., ¶¶ 10-14, Exhs. A-B.) Plaintiffs allege that on or about July 1, 2022, they discovered black mold along the baseboards of their master bathroom. (Compl., ¶ 19, Exh. C.) Plaintiffs contacted All-American Mold Remediation & Consulting LLC (AMR) to investigate, and AMR found extensive water damage in the master bedroom and vanity area, detected high moisture throughout the ceiling and walls, and discovered mold and moisture in other parts of the master bathroom. (Compl., ¶¶ 20-22, Exh. D.) After AMRs first property inspection, Plaintiffs emailed the HOA and Defendant Vance, notifying them of the mold issue; Defendant Vance agreed to have a leak detection service conduct an inspection. (Compl., ¶¶ 23-24, Exh. E.) On July 22, 2022, American Leak Detection (ALD) inspected Unit 403 and determined water was leaking from Unit 403 to Unit 303 through a bathtubs improperly sealed spout and cover plates. (Compl., ¶¶ 26, 27, Exh. F.) Plaintiff also asserts that on July 25, 2022, AMR returned to Unit 303 and confirmed the source of the water damage as a leak from Unit 403s bathtub. (Compl., ¶ 28.) Plaintiffs further allege that while the ceiling in the Unit 303s master bathroom was open, Plaintiffs and ALD observed and recorded water entering Unit 303 from Unit 403 when the Defendant Vance ran water upstairs in Unit 403s bathroom. (Compl., ¶ 29.) On July 28, 2022, Plaintiffs allegedly spoke with Defendant Dibernardo, who disputed the leak in Unit 403 and refused to further communicate with Plaintiffs. Additionally, Plaintiffs claims Defendant Dibernardo will not provide Defendant Vance or the HOA with his insurance information. (Compl., ¶¶ 30-33.) Plaintiffs state Defendant Dibernardo allegedly hired a plumber to fix the leak in Unit 403, but no proof of work completion was provided to the HOA until around December 22, 2022. (Compl., ¶ 36.) Plaintiffs claim they were unable to live in Unit 303 as no assurances were made that the leak would not reoccur. (Ibid.) Legal Standard The purpose of a motion for summary judgment or summary adjudication is to provide courts with a mechanism to cut through the parties' pleadings in order to determine whether, despite their allegations, trial is in fact necessary to resolve their dispute. (Aguilar v. Atlantic Richfield Co. (2001) 25 Cal.4th 826, 843.) Code of Civil Procedure section 437c, subdivision (c), requires the trial judge to grant summary judgment if all the evidence submitted, and all inferences reasonably deducible from the evidence and uncontradicted by other inferences or evidence, show that there is no triable issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. (Adler v. Manor Healthcare Corp. (1992) 7 Cal. App. 4th 1110, 1119.) On a motion for summary judgment, the initial burden is always on the moving party to make a prima facie showing that there are no triable issues of material fact. (Scalfv. D. B. Log Homes, Inc. (2005) 128 Cal. App. 4th 1510, 1519.) A plaintiff or cross-complainant has met his or her burden of showing that there is no defense to a cause of action if that party has proved each element of the cause of action entitling the party to judgment on the cause of action. Once the plaintiff or cross-complainant has met that burden, the burden shifts to the defendant or cross-defendant to show that a triable issue of one or more material facts exists as to the cause of action or a defense thereto. Code Civ. Proc., § 437c(p)(1). When deciding whether to grant summary judgment, the court must consider all of the evidence set forth in the papers (except evidence to which the court has sustained an objection), as well as all reasonable inferences that may be drawn from that evidence, in the light most favorable to the party opposing summary judgment. (Avivi, supra, 159 Cal.App.4th at 467; CCP § 437c(c).) Evidentiary Objections The Court rules as follows on Defendant Dibernardos evidentiary objections to the Declaration of Michele Travis: Nos. 1, 3 and 4 (Overruled) and Nos. 2 and 5 (Sustained). The Court rules as follows on Defendant Dibernardos evidentiary objections to the Declaration of William Idleman. Nos. 1 and 2 (Overruled). Judicial Notice Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice of Exhibit 1 (Declaration of Establishment of Basis Protective Restrictions, Limitations, Conditions, Covenants and Reservations recorded on August 23, 1973, as Instrument No. 3059 in the Official Records of Los Angeles County) is granted pursuant to Evidence Code, §§ 451, 452, subds. (c) and (g). Parties Arguments Plaintiffs move for summary adjudication on the following: (1) 1st Cause of Action (Breach of the Governing Documents); (2) whether Defendants owed a duty to maintain Unit 403 in accordance with the CC&Rs; (3) whether Defendants owed a duty not to commit a nuisance; and (4) whether Defendants owed a duty of care under the negligence cause of action not to damage Plaintiffs property. Defendant Dibernardo opposes arguing that: (1) Plaintiffs First Cause of Action for Breach of the HOA Governing Documents is essentially a breach of contract claim and (2) triable issues of material facts exist. Analysis The existence of an issue of duty may be a proper subject for a motion for summary adjudication. Courts may summarily adjudicate that one or more defendants either owed or did not owe a duty to the plaintiff or plaintiffs. (CCP § 437c(f)(1); Linden Partners v. Wilshire Linden Assocs. (1998) 62 Cal.App.4th 508, 518. Thus, theoretically, a motion for summary adjudication as to whether Defendant owed a duty under the CC & Rs would be appropriate. Plaintiffs characterize their motion as seeking adjudication as to whether Defendants owed a duty under the CC&Rs. However, the instant motion, as well as Plaintiffs separate statement of facts, it appears that Plaintiffs not only seek the Court to determine whether such a duty exists as a matter of law, but consequently, find that the Defendants breached their alleged duty and are liable for damages as a matter of law. (Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Adjudication, p. 5:7-14, 9:28 10:1-5, 13:22-23.) The instant motion for summary adjudication as the 1st cause of action; Issue of Duty No. 1 - whether Defendants owed a duty to maintain Unit 403 in accordance with the CC&Rs; Issue of Duty No. 2 - whether Defendants owed a duty not to commit a nuisance; and Issue of Duty No. 3 -whether Defendants owed a duty of care under the negligence cause of action not to damage Plaintiffs property are denied to the extent that the motion seeks adjudication of the elements of breach and causation. These are not proper matters for a motion for summary adjudication. (See Paramount Petroleum Corp. v. Superior Court (2014) 227 Cal.App.4th 226, 243 [where damages are an element of a cause of action, such as here in the cause of action for negligence, and the damages amount remains disputed, Plaintiff cannot obtain summary adjudication on the elements pertaining to liability]). Assuming arguendo that the Defendants are bound under the terms of the CR&Rs, which Defendants may not dispute (See DSSUF Nos. 7-9), the Court finds there are triable issues of material facts as to whether Defendants Dibernardo and Vance breach their duty of care under the CC&Rs, whether that breach resulted in the alleged water damage of Unit 303, and/or whether alternative sources within Unit 303s bathroom contributed to the claimed damage. (See DSSUF 2-7, 10; Daly Decl., ¶¶ 4, 6-11; Carpenter Decl., ¶¶ 6-12, 14, 15.)

Ruling

DWG INTERNATIONAL, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ON BEHALF OF ITSELF AND AS ASSIGNEE FOR HOLLYWOOD AND IVAR, L VS ROCK OF AGES HOLLYWOOD, LLC, A CALIFORNIA LIMITED LIABILITY COMPANY, ET AL.

Jul 17, 2024 |21STCV40405

Case Number: 21STCV40405 Hearing Date: July 17, 2024 Dept: 57 Pending before the Court is the Motion of Plaintiff DWG International, Inc. (DWG) to Compel the Concurrent Depositions of Defendant John Sofio (Sofio) and the Personal Most Knowledgeable (PMK) for Defendant Built, Inc (Motion to Compel). Sofio is the PMK for Built. The Motion to Compel is denied. The Motion to Compel was brought under Code of Civil Procedure Section 2025.450(a). It provides that, [i]f, after service of a deposition notice, a party [,] without having served a valid objection [to the notice], fails to appear for examination, or to proceed with it [,] the party giving the notice may move for an order compelling the deponents attendance and testimony . . . . In the Motion to Compel, DWG has failed to demonstrate that the statutory requirements of Section 2025.450(a) have been met. The record before the Court shows that there appears to have been an agreement by all parties, including Built and Sofio, that Sofio would appear for a deposition in both his individual capacity and as the PMK for Built, concurrently, on April 12, 2024, and that if the deposition did not conclude that day, Sofio would appear in both capacities to complete the deposition on April 15, 2024. The scheduling of the Sofio and Built PMK depositions was part of a larger agreement between the parties for the scheduling various depositions of parties and the order in which the depositions would occur. The problem with the Motion to Compel is that DWG served two deposition notices on Sofio and Built for two different days. The first one was for the attendance of Sofio in his individual capacity on April 12, 2024. The second one was for the attendance of Builts PMK on April 15, 2024. The two notices are at odds with the parties agreement in that the notices do not reflect concurrent depositions on the same day of Sofio individually and Sofio as Builts PMK. To compound the problem for the Motion to Compel, Sofio appeared for a deposition in his individual capacity on April 12, 2024. When counsel for Built stated that the PMK deposition would have to wait until April 15, 2024, which is for when that deposition was noticed, DWGs counsel halted the deposition and stated that he would be filing a motion to compel to enforce the parties agreement. On this record, the Section 2025.450(a) requirements have not been met here. For one, Sofio did not fail to attend the deposition that was noticed for April 12, 2024 the deposition of him in his individual capacity. Sofio dutifully appeared for that deposition. Second, Sofio did not fail to proceed with that deposition. He was prepared to go forward with it. It was DWG that halted the deposition. For these reasons, the Motion to Compel is denied. DWG also has filed a second and related motion that is pending before the Court. It is a Motion for a Protective Order, the purpose of which is to enforce the aforementioned agreement between the parties regarding the order and scheduling of multiple depositions, including the concurrent depositions of Sofio individually and as PMK of Built. Sofio and Built filed one consolidated opposition to the Motion to Compel and the Motion for a Protective Order. But in the body of their opposition, Sofio and Built do not address at all the basis for the Motion for a Protective Order. In the Courts view, a protective order is warranted here to enforce the parties agreement. The position that Sofio and Built took at the April 12, 2024 deposition did not violate Section 2025.450(a). But it did violate the letter and spirit of the parties agreement regarding the order and scheduling of depositions in this case. Accordingly, the Court is granting the Motion for a Protective Order to the extent it asks the Court to enforce the parties agreement. The parties shall meet and confer forthwith to arrange new dates for the depositions in question, in the agreed upon order. The Motion for a Protective Order is denied to the extent that it asks the Court to impose sanctions against Sofio, Built, and their attorneys. Under the circ*mstances here, the Court does not believe that a sanctions award is warranted. In particular, the Court has determined that even though Sofio and Built acted in contravention of the agreement, it would have been more prudent for DWG to proceed with the deposition of Sofio on April 12, 2024 and then depose him as the PMK of Built on April 15, 2024 instead of halting the deposition on April 12, 2024 and resorting to motion practice that ran up attorneys fees for DWG, Built, and Sofio.

Ruling

JAMILAH DUNCAN VS JAMISHA DUNCAN, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |22STCV33544

Case Number: 22STCV33544 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 58 Judge Bruce Iwasaki Department 58 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Case Name: Jamilah Duncan v. Jamisha Duncan Case No.: 22STCV33544 Related Case: 23CMCV00583 Motion: Motion for Order (1) Approving Attorneys Fees to Plaintiffs Counsel in the Amount of $50,754.50 [Net $43,689,39]; (2) Approving Supplemental Fees to Partition Referee in the Amount of $6,377.50; (3) Ordering that Balance of the Funds be Interpleaded due to Conflicting Claims Moving Party: Plaintiff Jamilah Duncan Responding Party: None as of July 12, 2024 Tentative Ruling: Plaintiffs Motion for Order (1) Approving Attorneys Fees to Plaintiffs Counsel in the Amount of $50,754.50 [Net 43,689,39]; (2) Approving Supplemental Fees to Partition Referee in the Amount of $6,377.50; (3) Ordering that Balance of the Funds be Interpleaded due to Conflicting Claims is GRANTED. I. Background On October 12, 2024, Plaintiff Jamilah Duncan filed this action against Defendants Jamisha Duncan, Jahlil Vigil and Natalie Gergely alleging (1) Partition of Real Property; (2) Battery; (3) Negligence; (4) IIED; and (5) NIED. Plaintiff owns a 50% interest in 246 East 135th Street, Los Angeles, CA (the Property) as a tenant in common with Defendant Jamisha Duncan. Plaintiff seeks an order for partition of the Property. Plaintiff also alleges that Defendant Jamisha Duncan and Jahlil Vigil attacked her on June 16, 2022. On February 23, 2024, the court approved a partition by sale of real property, which sale closed on April 16, 2024. Sales proceeds in the amount of $150,883.82 were deposited with the Court on April 24, 2024. Thereafter, on May 3, 2024, the Court directed that this motion for fees should be filed and set for hearing on July 16, 2024. II. Discussion A. Applicable Law The costs of partition include: (a) Reasonable attorney's fees incurred or paid by a party for the common benefit. (b) The fee and expenses of the referee. (c) The compensation provided by contract for services of a surveyor or other person employed by the referee in the action. (d) The reasonable costs of a title report procured pursuant to Section 872.220 with interest thereon at the legal rate from the time of payment or, if paid before commencement of the action, from the time of commencement of the action. (e) Other disbursem*nts or expenses determined by the court to have been incurred or paid for the common benefit. (Code Civ. Proc., § 874.010.) The costs of partition as apportioned by the court may be ordered paid in whole or in part prior to judgment. (Code Civ. Proc., §874.110(a).) The proceeds of sale for any property shall be applied in the following order: (a) Payment of the expenses of sale. (b) Payment of the other costs of partition in whole or in part or to secure any cost of partition later allowed. (c) Payment of any liens on the property in their order of priority except liens which under the terms of sale are to remain on the property. (d) Distribution of the residue among the parties in proportion to their shares as determined by the court. (Code Civ. Proc., §873.820.) The court must order that all the sale proceeds and any security be either transferred to the interested persons or held for their benefit. The proceeds may be held by being deposited in court, placed in trust, invested in California or federal Government bonds, or deposited in a savings account in a federally insured institution. (Code Civ. Proc., § 873.810.) Holding proceeds may be appropriate, for example, pending resolution of a dispute over payment of a lien. (Legislative Com. Comment to C.C.P. 873.820.) (See C.E.B., 1 Real Property Remedies and Damages 2d, § 8.81 et seq.) (12 Witkin, Summary (11th ed. 2017), Real Prop, §80.) B. Request for Attorneys Fees Reasonable Plaintiff incurred attorneys fees of $50,754.50 for the common benefit based on 10 hours of legal work drafting and filing the Complaint and obtaining defaults, approximately 50 hours in connection with law and motion practice in this action and approximately 20 hours in connection with settlement discussions with Defendant Jamisha Duncan, negotiations with the foreclosing lender, negotiations with Defendants former attorneys, both of whom filed liens and/or lis pendens, conversations with the partition referee, and drafting various stipulations re: agreements to vacate on close of sale and agreements to release liens in return for an order depositing all funds with the clerk of court. (Motion, Butler Dec., ¶¶5-7.) The remaining time was spent on miscellaneous court proceedings or communications with other parties or the partition referee. (Id.) Plaintiff requests a net attorneys fee award of $43,689.39. Plaintiffs explanation for this amount is unclear. Plaintiff claims there the net sales proceeds were $258,765.86. Plaintiff then states The subtraction of outstanding fees of $57,132.00, leaves a balance of $201,633.86. (Motion, 5:19-20.) There is no explanation as to what these outstanding fees in the points and authorities or Butlers declaration. The accuracy of Plaintiffs calculation of the balance of sale proceeds therefore cannot be confirmed. Accepting the accuracy of Plaintiffs calculation of the net sales proceeds, Plaintiff and Defendant Jamisha were entitled to half of that amount$100,816.93. A judgment lien against Plaintiff was paid from the sale proceeds through escrow in the amount of $107,882.04. As such, Plaintiff received $7,065.11 more than she was entitled to from the net sales proceeds ($107,882.04-$100,816.93). Plaintiff states that amount should be deducted from Plaintiffs attorneys fees of $50,754.50, leaving a net attorney fee award of $43,689. Plaintiffs counsel submits a declaration attesting to an hourly rate of $595. (Motion, Butler Dec., ¶3.) Plaintiffs counsel attests to approximately 80 hours dedicated to the partition sale and the common benefit of the tenants in common. (Id. at ¶¶5-7.) Plaintiffs counsel attaches copies of itemized bills for work performed on this matter. (Id. at ¶4, Ex. 1.) Based on a review of the bills, the amount requested is reasonable and incurred for the common benefit. No opposition was filed to the request for fees. The request for attorneys fees is granted as recoverable cost of partition under Code of Civil Procedure §874.010(a). C. Request for Supplemental Award of Referees Fees Reasonable The partition referee, Charles Grimes, has already received $13,522.50 for the service rendered in this action and costs were advanced in the amount of $800. Grimes now requests an additional $6,337.50 for services rendered up to the date of discharge by deposit with the court of the net sales proceeds. Grimes provides a declaration in support of that amount for services rendered from February 9, 2024 through May 3, 2024. (Motion, Grimes Dec., Attachment). Funds were deposited with the clerk on April 24, 2024 and Grimes attended a status conferred regarding the sale on May 3, 2024. (Id.) The request for a supplemental award of referees fees in the amount of $6,337.50 is granted. Such fees are recoverable costs of partition under Code of Civil Procedure §874.010(b). D. Request that Balance of Funds be Interpleaded Proper Interpleader is proper whenever double or multiple claims are made & by two or more persons & such that they may [expose the person against whom the claims are asserted] & to double or multiple liability & (Code of Civ. P., §386(b).) The true test of suitability for interpleader is the stakeholder's disavowal of interest in the property sought to be interpleaded, coupled with the perceived ability of the court to resolve the entire controversy as to entitlement to the property without need for the stakeholder to be a party to the suit. (Pacific Loan Mgmt. Corp. v. Sup.Ct. (Armstrong) (1987) 196 Cal.App.3d 1485, 1489-1490.) The function of an interpleader action is to eliminate the risk of incorrectly resolving conflicting claims. When a disagreement arises as to the ownership of said property, the holder thereof has not obligated himself to settle said disagreement and deliver the property to either of said parties in the face of conflicting claims thereto. (Southern California Gas Co. v. Flannery (2014) 232 Cal.App.4th 477, 489 (citing Pacific Loan Management Corp., supra and Cantu v. Resolution Trust Corp. (1992) 4 Cal.App.4th 857, 876 (stakeholder not obligated to resolve the apparent dispute without the consent of the competing claimants).) Typical situations permitting interpleader include a bank escrow holder faced with conflicting claims of vendor, purchaser and purchaser's assignee; an escrow holder of a fund where one claimant notified the escrow holder that the contract was cancelled and nothing should be paid to the other claimant; and an insurance company admitting liability under a life insurance policy where conflicting claims to the proceeds existed. (Pacific Loan Mgmt., supra, 196 Cal.App.3d at 1490.) Plaintiff asks that the court order that the remaining net sales proceeds that are due Defendant Jamisha Duncan be interpleaded with the court. Plaintiff maintains there are two attorney liens against Jamisha that have not been reduced to a judgment and therefore could not be paid from escrow. The two liens total $114,045.18, which exceeds the amount of sales proceeds due to Jamisha ($100,816.93 if Plaintiffs calculation is accepted as correct). In the face of these two competing attorney liens which exceed the amount of proceeds due Jamisha, Plaintiffs request for an order requiring interpleader is proper. At the hearing the Court will determine the custodian for the interpleaded funds. III. Conclusion Plaintiffs Motion for Order (1) Approving Attorneys Fees to Plaintiffs Counsel in the Amount of $50,754.50 [Net 43,689,39]; (2) Approving Supplemental Fees to Partition Referee in the Amount of $6,377.50; (3) Ordering that Balance of the Funds be Interpleaded due to Conflicting Claims is GRANTED.

Ruling

Charles Cox vs Richard Mroczek, et al

Jul 20, 2024 |23CV02337

23CV02337COX v. MROCZEK, et al. CONFIRMATION OF 6/28/24 ORDER TO GRANT DEFENDANTS’ MOTION TO STRIKE COMPLAINT AND OBJECTION TO DECLARATION OF NONMONETARY STATUS The court has reviewed plaintiff’s Notification of Objection to and Disapproval of AnyProposed Order or Other Order: 1) Granting Defendants’ Motion to Strike the Complaint; or 2)Striking Plaintiff’s First Amended Complaint. Plaintiff’s objections merely go to the process bywhich parties engage on proposed orders; CRC 3.1312 has no impact on the power of the courtto strike plaintiff’s amended complaint and dismiss this action. The court’s previous order of 6/28/24 granting defendants’ motion to strike plaintiff’samended complaint is confirmed, as is dismissal of this action. Defendants are ordered to submita formal dismissal order for the court’s signature. Page 1 of 2Notice to prevailing parties: Local Rule 2.10.01 requires you to submit a proposed formal orderincorporating, verbatim, the language of any tentative ruling – or attaching and incorporating thetentative by reference - or an order consistent with the announced ruling of the Court, inaccordance with California Rule of Court 3.1312. Such proposed order is required even if theprevailing party submitted a proposed order prior to the hearing (unless the tentative issimply to “grant”). Failure to comply with Local Rule 2.10.01 may result in the imposition ofsanctions following an order to show cause hearing, if a proposed order is not timely filed. Page 2 of 2

Ruling

ISA J. MUHAWIEH VS. YOHALMA MARTINEZ ET AL

Jul 18, 2024 |CUD24674516

Real Property/Housing Court Law and Motion Calendar for July 18, 2024 line 10. PLAINTIFF ISA MUAWIEH MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT Hearing Required to address service. Proof of Service on file indicates service at a location that is not Defendant's address of record. =(501/CFH) Parties may appear in-person, telephonically or via Zoom (Video - Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849; or Phone Dial in: (669) 254-5252; Webinar ID: 160 560 5023; Password: 172849). Parties who intend to appear at the hearing must give notice to opposing parties and the court promptly, but no later than 4:00 p.m. the court day before the hearing unless the tentative ruling has specified that a hearing is required. Notice of contesting a tentative ruling shall be provided by sending an email to the court to Department501ContestTR@sftc.org with a copy to all other parties stating, without argument, the portion(s) of the tentative ruling that the party contests. A party may not argue at the hearing if the opposing party is not so notified, and the opposing party does not appear.

Ruling

NIVO 1 LLC, ET AL. VS LIN DEE LU SERVICES, A CALIFORNIA CORPORATION, ET AL.

Jul 16, 2024 |21STCV17195

Case Number: 21STCV17195 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Dept: 50 Superior Court of California County of Los Angeles Department 50 NIVO 1, LLC, et al., Plaintiffs, vs. LIN DEE LU SERVICES, et al., Defendants. Case No.: 21STCV17195 Hearing Date: July 16, 2024 Hearing Time: 10:00 a.m. [TENTATIVE] ORDER RE: MOTION TO BE RELIEVED AS COUNSEL Steven J. Barkin of the Law Offices of Steven J. Barkin (Counsel) moves to be relieved as counsel of record for Plaintiffs Nivo 1, LLC, D.A. Beec-007, LLC, and Anne Kihagi. The Court finds that Counsel has provided sufficient reason for withdrawal. However, the Court notes that after the instant motion was filed, a Trial Setting Conference was held in which a Final Status Conference (FSC) was scheduled for August 9, 2024, and a Non-Jury Trial was scheduled for August 28, 2024. (See July 9, 2024 Minute Order.) Thus, the proposed order (Form MC-053) do not list the August 9, 2024 FSC or the August 28, 2024 trial date. In addition, Item 6 of the proposed order does not list Counsels clients telephone number(s). If Counsel provides the Court with a revised order correcting the foregoing defects prior to the hearing, the Court will grant the motion.¿ Counsel is ordered to give notice of this order. DATED: July 16, 2024 ________________________________ Hon. Teresa A. Beaudet Judge, Los Angeles Superior Court

Ruling

Eckelman, et al. vs. OLCO, Inc

Jul 16, 2024 |23CV-0202690

ECKELMAN, ET AL. VS. OLCO, INCCase Number: 23CV-0202690This matter is on calendar for review regarding status of the case and trial setting. The Court designates thismatter as a Plan II case and intends to set the matter for trial no later than January 22, 2025. The parties areordered to meet and confer prior to the hearing regarding proposed dates for trial. An appearance is necessaryon today’s calendar.

Ruling

ARNOLD, KIMBLY vs STEARNS LENDING SERVICES LLC

Jul 16, 2024 |CV-22-004332

CV-22-004332 – ARNOLD, KIMBLY vs STEARNS LENDING SERVICES LLC – Defendant Loancare LLC’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to Amend - DENIED.Following the filing of Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint, Defendant’s Motion is denied.

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